"Eat it again for the first time": Identity in a world of Change Our everyday experience is well acquainted with the reality of constancy (identity) and change. Persistence over time -continuity -is normally accompanied by an awareness of change -discontinuity. Although the temptation is immediately to enter into logicalmathematical problems, this article wants to highlight first of all the underlying ontological issues and distinctions required to gain a better understanding of the familiar term identity. In order to achieve this goal the idea of identity is related to the nature of an entity and its properties. Plato's account of identity and change paved the way for an enduring philosophical wrestling with this problem. A static logic of identity may rule out change (Von Kibèd), but on the basis of Galileo and Einstein the original insight of Plato, namely that change can only be established on the basis of constancy, acquires a new natural scientific meaning. Acknowledging the more-than-functional and multi-functional nature of the identity of an entity helps to avoid any attempt that wants to explain the nature of entities exhaustively merely in terms of one aspect only and it supports the distinction between conceptual knowledge and concept-transcending knowledge. In the final analysis the human awareness of the identity of entities amidst change explores the foundational interconnectedness between the kinematic and the physical aspect in the context of concept-transcending knowledge.
1 1 "Carnap maintained, and Frege before him, that the laws of logic held by virtue purely of language: by virtue of the meanings of the logical words. In a word, they are analytic. I have protested more than once that no empirical meaning has been given to the notion of meaning, nor, consequently, to this linguistic theory of logic" (Quine, 1973:78) . On the next page, however, he does open the door for analyticity, but within a perspective that hinges on "social uniformity" -"a sentence is analytic if everybody learns that it is true by learning its words" (Quine, 1973:79) . 5 slippers hanging low as they bend under the weight of unexpectedly late snow (1984:1) .
These remarks are all dependent on the implicit assumption that entities endure over time.
The Dutch language expresses this phenomenon by referring to "het zich zijn en zich blijven" of entities.
3 However, already early Greek philosophy challenged this assumption when Heraclitus argued that everything is taken up in [559] constant flux (B Fr.90) . 4 It was Cratylus, a younger contemporary of Socrates and associate teacher of Plato, who caused the latter to come to the one-sided view of the ideas found in the thought of Heraclitus. Cratylus interpreted Heraclitus to say that all perceptible things are in a process of change and that they are therefore unknowable. In his dialogue, Cratylus,
Plato portays him as claiming that since we cannot say "what is not" we are also unable to say what is false. Cratylus took change in such a radical sense that he even questioned references to what is the "same" -such as found in the alleged statement of Heraclitus that one cannot step into the same river twice: one cannot step into the same river even once (see Freeman, 1949:285) . Apparently the implication of this radicalized position regarding change is that since there is never something to hold on to identity is impossible as well.
Plato on identity and change
Behind this consequence we find the school of Parmenides denying multiplicity in its fundamental identification of thought and being. 5 Thought can only think what is, because it cannot contemplate what does not exist. Veling remarks that Parmenides inspired later thinkers to engage in a rational search for "true reality" amidst all that is changeful (Veling, 2000:29) .
With an appeal to the logical principle of identity Von Kibèd argues as follows against the (logical) "impossibility" of change. The continued existence of an entity over time is derived from an appeal to the (logical) law of identity: [560] Zeno's arguments against multiplicity and movement (Achilles and the Tortoise, the flying arrow, and so on) simply explore the basic position taken by Parmenides in his claim that thought and being are the same.
The principle of identity, according to which everything is only identical to itself, actually forbids every change, every becoming-different, every stepping-outside of a substance from its being-itself (Von Kibèd, 1979:59) .
He is well aware of the fact the some thinkers (like Aristotle) employ the distinction between essence and appearance to account both for the identity and the change of an entity:
The difficulties accompanying the concept of the changes of an unchangeable thing are side-stepped by dividing the entity into an essential and accidental part, thus producing the possibility to associate unchangeability with its essence and changeability with what is accidental (Von Kibèd, 1979:60) .
However, according to Von Kibèd this won't help us, because also the accidental features of an entity are subject to the law of identity: "according to the principle of identity also the accidental must remain identical to itself and cannot abolish its essence, which is given in its accidental nature" (1979:60). His conclusion is therefore to be expected: "The concept of change is therefore logically unthinkable " (1979:60) . What is needed in order to account for change, namely "the concept of causality, is logically seen non-transparent and shows the limits of logical explanation" (Von Kibèd, 1979:60-61 The conception of nature that rendered the most significant service to physics up till the present is undoubtedly the mechanical. If we consider that this standpoint proceeds from the assumption that all qualitative differences are ultimately explicable by motions, then we may well define the mechanistic conception as the conviction that all physical processes could be reduced completely to the motions (the italics are mine -DFMS) of unchangeable, similar mass-points or mass-elements (Planck, 1973:53) .
In kinematics all processes are reversible in principle. This reversibility concerns the kinematical time order of uniformity (constancy). 6 As such it lies at the foundation of the dynamic changes discernable within physical processes of energy transformation. This reversibility is analogous to numerical succession and spatial co-existence -which are both also reversible. The reversibility of the numerical time order first of all flows from the reversibility of the + and -directions in the system of integers. Although concrete events in physical reality are unidirectional, the time order within the numerical aspect could be experienced both in the positive and the negative directions.
Clausius introduced the term entropy. This law accounts for the irreversibility of physical processes since it determines the direction of a physical (or chemical) process in a closed system.
Thus the law of non-decreasing entropy was established as the second main law of thermodynamics. At the same time the classical mechanistic reduction to pure motion was uprooted. Justifiably, therefore, Max Planck (in his mentioned article from 1910)
remarks that the "irreversibility of natural processes" confronted the "mechanistic conception of nature" with "insurmountable problems"[562] (Planck, 1973:55 In a different context Janich draws a clear distinction between phoronomic and dynamic statements. 7 He states that the scope of the strict distinction between phoronomic (subsequently called kinematic) and dynamic arguments could be explained in terms of an example. Modern physics has to employ a dynamic interpretation of the statement that a body can alter its speed continuously only. Given certain conditions a body can never accelerate in a discontinuous way, that is to say, it cannot change its speed through an infinitely large acceleration, because that will require an infinite force.
8
Since the discovery of radio-activity it turned out that within micro-structures themselves there are irreversible processes present proceeding spontaneously in one direction only.
In addition, this state of affairs, straightaway, confirms the irreducibility of the physical 7
The early 19 th century German philosopher, von Baader, already employed a distinction between the mechanical and dynamical (see von Baader, 1851:52 ff. -an exposition forming part of a contribution to a dynamic philosophy as opposed to a mechanical one: "Beiträge zur dynamischen Philosophie im Gegensatze zu der mechanischen").
"Die Tragweite einer strengen Unterscheidung phoronomischer (im folgenden kinematisch genannt) und dynamischer Argumente möchte ich an einem Beispiel erläutern, das ... aus der Protophysik stammt. Die Aussage 'ein Körper kann seine Geschwindigkeit nur stetig ändern' kann von der modernen Physik nur dynamisch verstanden werden. Geschwindigkeitsänderungen sind Beschleunigung, d.h. als Zweite Ableitung des Weges nach der Zeit definiert. Zeit wird von der Physik als ein Parameter behandelt, an dessen Erzeugung durch eine Parametermaschine ("Uhr") de facto bestimmte Homogenitätserwartungen geknüpft sind ... Bezogen auf dem Gang einer angeblich so ausgewählten Parametermaschine kann ein Körper seine Geschwindigkeit deshalb nich unstetig, d.h. mit unendlich große Beschleunigung ändern, weil dazu eine unendlich große Kraft erförderlich wäre" (Janich, 1975:68-69). aspect to the kinematical aspect (with its reversible time order). It is therefore incorrect to say that "change" is the only "constant." [563] Already Bryon and Spielberg correctly emphasize that Einstein's theory concerns "invariance" -i.e. constancy -but unfortunately they confuse the terms absolute and unchanging:
Indeed, Einstein originally developed his theory in order to find those things that are invariant (absolute and unchanging) rather than the relative. He was concerned with things that are universal and the same from all points of view (Bryon and Spielberg, 1987:6 reason we shall find within the physical aspect a structural moment which reminds us of the foundational meaning of the kinematic aspect. Constancy appears in the physical aspect as a structural reminder of the meaning of motion. In philosophical terms we may say that we find an analogy of the kinematic aspect at the law side of the physical aspect (see Strauss, 2000) .
A formulation of the first main law of thermodynamics which intends to be true to reality would therefore have to refer to energy constancy. Strictly speaking, the use of the term "conservation" is inadequate, since the activity of retention itself requires an input of energy -as in the case of thermodynamic "open systems" (or "steady states"). The law of energy constancy illustrates not only the distinct uniqueness of the kinematic and physical aspects, but, while taking into account the distinction between law side and factual side, also the indissoluble coherence between them: without the foundational position of the kinematic aspect in the order of the various cosmic aspects we would have no grounds for discerning an analogy of the aspect of movement within the physical aspect, that is, the analogy of energy constancy. The distinctness and mutual coherence of constancy and change renders the statement that change is the only constant meaningless.
Modes of explanation making identity understandable
The idea of an entity transcends any particular mode of explanation through which knowledge of entities is obtainable. One can explore different modes of explanation to demonstrate this perspective. But whenever any specific mode of explanation is used two things ought to be kept in mind. (i) Approaching an entity from one functional (aspectual) perspective only can never exhaust the full, many-sided existence of such an entity; (ii)
Terms from any specific mode (aspect/function/facet) of reality could be used in a way stretching beyond the limits of the mode under consideration -in which case it could be used in a concept-transcending way to refer to the entire existence of an entity.
11
The term absolute cannot really be applied to anything in creation, that is, not if one wants to avoid the idolization / absolutization of created reality.
When we speak about the unity of an entity, the fact that it is one, a straight-forward appeal is made to the quantitative function of such an entity (in which case the numerical terms 'one' and 'unity' are used conceptually, i.e. they are employed to refer to the way in which an entity functions within the arithmetical aspect). But the philosophical [565] legacy of the West also explored our numerical intuition by using it to refer to more than the mere quantitative aspect of an entity. The acknowledgement of the individuality and uniqueness of an entity is quantitatively conditioned in that it is distinct. But this awareness of the individuality of an entity (its being distinct) does not merely capture the numerical qualities of an entity since it at once alludes to all other features of it as well.
In other words, functional terms, such as those having their seat within the quantitative mode of reality, can be used to refer to the way in which an entity functions within the boundaries of a specific aspect (the conceptual use of the terms 'one' and 'unity'), or our numerical intuition can be stretched in concept-transcending ways to refer to the total existence of an entity in terms of the idea of its uniqueness or individuality.
Therefore, when an entity is seen as an individual entity, i.e., as being distinct from other entities, the (co-conditioning) role of the quantitative is at stake. Yet this fact does not justify the elevation of number to become the "principle of individuation" as it is found in Aristotle who connected the category of quantity with matter: "But all things that are many in number have matter" (Metaph.1074a33-34).
In addition to the just mentioned numerical mode of explanation the description of an entity may explore the spatial mode by adding a different specification, for instance when an entity is designated as an individual whole (totality). But it is only when we explore the points of entry offered by the kinematical and physical aspects of reality that we are capable of articulating a well founded intuition of identity, for then we can add further specifications in saying that an entity is an enduring individual whole in spite of any changes to which it may be subjected. The term identity acquires a concept-transcending meaning in the sense that it stretches the original kinematical meaning of movement beyond its modal (aspectual) limits to refer to the entity in the totality of its persistence (enduring existence). This idea of identity presupposes the core kinematical meaning of a uniform motion but it cannot be reduced to it.
In general one can say that terms residing within a particular modal aspect may therefore be applied in a twofold sense, either as referring to phenomena functioning within the aspect concerned, or terms like these may be employed in such a way that they stand in the service of an understanding transcending the limited context of a specific mode of explanation. When the awareness of uniform motion is applied to the description of a uniformly moving body in a purely (abstract) kinematic sense, we may say that such a term is[566] used in a conceptual way. However, the moment we expand our scope and use the term "constancy" in order to refer to the identity of an entity over time in spite of changes it may experience, then the intuition of constancy is expanded in a concepttranscending way that is manifest in speaking about the identity of such an entity.
The phrase concept-transcending knowledge can be designated as idea-knowledge, where it is assumed that a form of thought is needed in order to capture that kind of knowledge transcending the limits of concept formation. 12 In general therefore our talking about the identity of things rests upon the basis of a concept-transcending idea of the transmodal reality of entities. 13 It entails that entities belong to a distinct dimension of reality intimately cohering with another dimension of reality, namely that of modal functions (aspects). We only have access to entities because these aspects not only serve as modes of being and modes of explanation, but also as experiential points of entry to entities.
Lowe is justified in distinguishing between identity and unity: "A principle of individuation, we might say, is not so much a criterion of identity as a principle of unity" (Lowe, 1998:33) . But in stead of exploring the kinematical meaning of uniform motion and its expansion to the idea of the identity of an entity, Lowe reverts to the logicalmathematical criterion of identity advanced by Frege (see Lowe, 1998:41 Nicolai Hartmann therefore aptly explained Kant's notion of the ideas of reason in a similar fashion. The thought-form required to think of an unknowable "thing-in-itself" ("Ding an sich") is what a "Grenzbegriff" intends to capture [see Strauss, 2003a :254, particularly also note 17 about the translational equivalent of Grenzbegriff (= concept-transcending knowledge)]. In passing, it should be noted that conceptual knowledge is constituted by universality whereas idea-knowledge approximates what is unique, individual and contingent. 13 Dooyeweerd writes: "The transcendental Idea of the individual whole precedes the theoretical analysis of its modal functions. It is its pre-suposition, its cosmological a-priori" (Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:65 From a purely mechanistic or physicalistic point of view a living thing is explicable in physical terms only. But then it must display a physico-chemical identity constituted by its atoms, molecules, and macro-molecules. The problem, however, is that all these orientation for considering the issue of identity without realizing that the ontic conditions for identity precedes the meaning of logical analysis. But this issue requires the special attention of a different article!
15
Frege certainly employs an appropriate expression when he speaks about "Identitätsurteile" / "identity propositions" (Frege, 2001:15) . But while he immediately relates such propositions to the logical principle of identity, our argument opts to account for the given ontic reality of enduring entities.
16
Once more we have to point out that Einstein did not develop a theory of relativity, but rather a theory of constancy.
17
Carnap proceeds from a fairly simplistic and reduced view when he discusses five basic relations as 'categories': "identity, similarity, intensity, time, and space" (Carnap, 1967:135) . With these terms Carnap intends the numerical ('identity'), the spatial ('similarity', 'space'), the kinematical ('time') and the physical ('intensity').
18
See Jones, 1998:40. con [568] stituents are constantly changing! Which of these physico-chemical components could then constitute this supposedly purely physico-chemical identity of living things?
Will it be those atoms, molecules, and macro-molecules currently present within it, those present years ago, or those that will be present a few years hence!?
When living things are physicalistically reduced to their material constituents, their biotical identity is necessarily lost -since the supposed elements of identity continually vary. 
21
From our preceding considerations important consequences follow.
1)
Whenever an idea of identity is formulated, the decisive clue is always given in the mode of explanation involved. For example, compared to the physical identity of material entities, living entities display a biotical identity.
2) Furthermore, whenever identity is the theme, at least an implicit awareness of the foundational relationship between constancy and dynamics is entailed.
3) Finally, since an entity is more than the sum of its different modes of explanation, no single (entitary) identity-claim can exhaust the uniqueness of any entity.
[569]
Sometimes a distinction is made between living and non-living entities: the first category applies to entities that retain their identity in spite of changes, whereas the second category refers to material things. Van Woudenberg remarks that the latter groups of
19
Plato discusses the example of a wooden ship of which all the constitutive parts are replaced on sea (Phaido, 58; see the discussion of Van Woudenberg, 2000:28) . 20 We should remember that Von Bertalanffy [on the basis of his idea of the dynamic equilibrium of matter is one of the most difficult and most mysterious concepts whatsoever. 23 Glas also proceeds from the idea of modal functions as modes of explanation when he remarks that he employs the term "level" with reference to "the qualitative distinctiveness between modes of reality" and to the distinctiveness of modes and entities: "When the modal analysis of an aspect of reality is fundamental in the process of abstraction, then the entitary reformulation of this modal (or functional) point of view may become a first step into the direction of reification and undue substantializing" (Glas, 2002:154) . In response to the approaches of Churchland and other neuroscientists he highlights the shortcomings both of dualist and monist accounts:
Psychophysical dualism and dualist interactionism may be seen as a result of the unjustified belief in the independent existence of mind and of body as (quasi -) substances. The modal aspect -mental functioning as a mode of functioning that qualitatively differs from biological functioning -is substantialized and changed into a mental substance or a mental entity called 'The Mind'. Psychophysical identity theories, on the other hand, run the risk of being transformed into one or another form of monism. This occurs when the nature of the 'common ground' of different forms of functioning is defined in terms of one particular scientific discipline, such as biology (Glas, 2002:164) .
Repko provides a penetrating analysis of various contemporary reductionist and antireductionist paradigms in the philosophy of mind. 24 [571]
Societal identities
The philosophy of mind and social philosophy also struggled extensively with issues of personal identity (traditionally: the supposed relationship between body and soul and 23 "Und daß auf der anderen Seite ausgerechnet der Materiebegriff der schwierigste, unbewältigste und rätselhafteste Begriff überhaupt für die Wissenschaft dieses Jahrhunderts blieb" (Stegmüller, 1987:90). more recently the just mentioned question regarding the identity of mind and brain) and with the complex relationships between the "individual" and "society" (collective identity). Am I in the first place someone with an ethnic identity (such as an Englishman, Zulu, Afrikaner, or Sotho) and only in the second instance partaking in a specific political identity (such as being a South African, American, etc.)?
The basic and important perspective in this context is that no single societal identityhowever much it is considered to be a "social construction" -can escape both from fundamental ontic modes of explanation co-conditioning human society (such as the lingual, 25 the economic, the social, the aesthetic, the jural and the moral) and the various possible identities human beings can construe (and assume) in the process of what Simmel calls sociation. Simmel holds that a number of individuals are only transformed from a spatial aggregate or a temporal sequence into a society when (through sociation) these individuals exercise a mutual influence upon each other: "If, therefore, there is to be a science whose subject matter is society and nothing else, it must exclusively investigate these interactions, these kinds and forms of sociation" (see Levine, 1971:24-25 It should be noted that every mode of explanation has a universal scope in the sense that whatever there is in principle has a function in every ontic mode of reality. Another way to refer to this state of affairs is to speak about the modal universality of different aspects. This may provide an(other) interpretation of Derrida's statement that there is nothing outside the text different from his own eventual explanation. In terms of the modal universality of the sign mode one can say that whatever there is within reality will always also function within this aspect -suggesting that there is indeed nothing outside the "text", i.e., not functioning within the "text" or sign mode. Derrida eventually said that "[t]he phrase which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of deconstruction ('there is nothing outside the text' [il n'y a pas de hors-texte]), means nothing else: there is nothing outside context" (Derrida, 1988:136) . In terms of our suggestion: there is no entitary existence outside the context of (multiple) modal universality!
26
According to Simmel, however, the assumed reality of a supra-individual society is a fatal reification of a mere abstraction (cf. Ziegenfuss, 1954:14) .
27
Analogous to the nature of thermodynamically open physical systems (a fire, glacier, etc.) various societal collectivities also continue their identity over time in spite of the coming and going of individual members.
This means that at once a person may be a father, citizen, club member, and so on, participating in these distinct social identities without fully being absorbed by any one of them. The mystery of the human being certainly coheres with the fact that no single differentiated social identity can fully and exhaustively encompass the nature of being human.
29

Concluding remark
The preceding discussion was mainly focused on the difference between an entity and the diverse modal aspects in which such an entity functions. The argument rests upon the assumption that an entity is transmodal in nature. The co-conditional role of functional aspects as modes of explanation supported our argument that change can only be established on the basis of constancy. Yet, the step from constancy to an awareness of identity needed a further elaboration -given in our brief account of the difference between a conceptual and a concept-transcending use of modal terms. 
